Online ciphers are those ciphers whose ciphertexts can be computed in real time by using a lengthpreserving encryption algorithm. HCBC1 and HCBC2 are two known examples of Hash Cipher Block Chaining online ciphers. The first construction is secure against chosen plaintext adversary (or called CPA-secure) whereas the latter is secure against chosen ciphertext adversary (or called CCA-secure). In this paper, we have provided simple security analysis of these online ciphers. We have also proposed two new more efficient chosen ciphertext secure online ciphers modified-HCBC (MHCBC) and modified-CBC (MCBC). If one uses a finite field multiplication based universal hash function, the former needs one less key and one less field multiplication compared to HCBC2. The MCBC does not need any universal hash function and it needs only one blockcipher key unlike the other three online ciphers where two independent keys (hash function and blockcipher) are required.
Introduction
In this paper we fix a finite group (G, +) (e.g., {0, 1} n with bitwise addition ⊕ for some fixed positive integer n). An element of G is called a block. A cipher over a domain D ⊆ G + := ∪ i≥1 G i is a keyed function family {F K } K∈K , where K is a key space and for each key K, F K : D → D is a length-preserving permutation on D (i.e., for each x ∈ D ∩ G i , F K (x) ∈ G i ). Any cipher over domain G is called a blockcipher. An important blockcipher is AES [6] with domain G = {0, 1}
128 . The pseudorandom permutation or PRP and strong pseudorandom permutation [10] or SPRP are two well known security notions for ciphers. They are also called chosen plaintext secure or CPA-secure and chosen ciphertext secure or CCA-secure. Intuitively, a cipher is called PRP (or SPRP) if it is indistinguishable from the ideal cipher based on encryption queries (or both encryption and decryption queries respectively). Intuitively an ideal cipher on D is chosen at random from Perm(D), the set of all permutations on D. If D is an infinite set then we define the ideal cipher runtime as queries being asked to it. A similar definition can be found for an ideal online cipher as defined in figure 1. In this paper we are interested in online cipher with domain G + whose i th ciphertext block C[i] is computable from the first i plaintext blocks M [1] , · · · , M [i] . The computation of the i th ciphertext is determined by a function called block function. The above property is popularly called online property. One can show that online ciphers can not be PRP since the online property itself can be used to distinguish it from an ideal cipher. The appropriate security notions are CPA-online secure and CCA-online secure [1] . Informally an online cipher is CPA-online secure (or CCA-online secure) if it is indistinguishable from an ideal online cipher (see figure 1 ) based on only encryption queries (or encryption and decryption queries both respectively). The possible candidates of online ciphers are in [3, 5, 8] , most of which are different variants of Cipher Block Chaining modes or CBC. If e ∈ Perm(D) then the CBC based on e with an initial value IV is defined as e + (x 1 , · · · , x m ) = (y 1 , · · · , y m ) where y i = E K (y i−1 + x i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m and y 0 = IV. One can see that CBC based on any blockcipher is an online cipher. In [1] authors have shown that CBC with public or secret IV [3] and ABC [8] ciphers (another example of online cipher) are not CPA-secure online ciphers. In the same paper [1] a CPA-secure HCBC1 online cipher and CCA-secure HCBC2 online cipher have been proposed. These online ciphers need two keys, one is for blockcipher and other is for Almost XOR Universal Hash family or AXU-hash family [15] , a special case of ∆universal hash family [9, 14, 16] .
Applicability of online ciphers. The known online ciphers Hash-CBC namely, HCBC1, HCBC2 and our constructions need current and previous plaintext block and previous cipher block to compute the current cipher block. Thus, online cipher could be used where encryption is made in an online manner with a very small amount of memory or buffer. It could be useful in scenarios where there is a constraint requiring length-preserving ciphertext. For example, one can think some ciphers dealing with fixed packet formats, legacy code and disk-sector encryption. In this situation, a length preserving PRP or SPRP can be used but potentially these may be costlier than online ciphers as these are stronger security notions than a CPA or CCA online secure.
Name of
CPA-secure CCA-secure # field # BC Key-size Online cipher multiplication HCBC1 [2] × m m n + k BC HCBC2 [2] 2m Here, G = {0, 1} n , the set of blocks and k BC denotes the key size of the blockcipher. The number of multiplications and block-cipher (BC) invocations are given to encrypt a plaintext with m blocks.
Our contributions. In this paper we have provided simple as well as concrete security analysis of HCBC1 and HCBC2. The proof idea can also be used in other online ciphers. For example, we have used the same approach to have security proof of our new proposals MHCBC and MCBC. These two new online ciphers have many advantages over the previous ciphers. MHCBC needs a universal hash function from G to G whereas HCBC2 needs a universal hash function from G 2 to G, which makes it a potential efficient candidate. For example, if we use field multiplication based universal hash function then we need one less field multiplication and one less key (see example 2.1). Our second construction modified-CBC or MCBC does not need any universal hash function. It needs only one blockcipher key. One can definitely replace the universal hash function of MHCBC by a blockcipher (since an ideal blockcipher is ∆universal hash function, see example 2.2) at the cost of an extra new independent blockcipher key which eventually causes an extra key-scheduling algorithm. In this paper we have shown that if we use same blockcipher key then MHCBC is not CCA-secure. Thus, the security of MCBC indeed is not straightforward from that of MHCBC. Table 1 provides a comparison of these four online ciphers.
Basic Definition and Results

We write
.j] = λ, the empty string. X * ← S means that the random variable X is chosen uniformly from a finite set S and it is independent with all previously defined random variables. An equivalent phrase "at random" is also widely used in cryptology. Let F : K × D → R where K is a finite set. By abuse of notation we denote f * ← F to mean that f := F K where K * ← K. The interpolation probability of F for any fixed tuple τ :
We define the set of all non-empty prefixes of
. In other words, p = (chop(p), last(p)) where last(p) ∈ G and chop(p) ∈ G * . Note that if p ∈ G then chop(p) = λ and last(p) = p. By our convention, last(λ) = 0. Now we define 
Proof. We prove that for any pair (i, j) with 1
The rest is clear by summing over all possible pairs (i, j).
By using a simple counting argument we can show that for any distinct
Since the number of permutations π ∈ Perm(G) such that π(
The above may not be true if x i 's and y i 's are random variables but we have similar result when these are independent with the uniform random permutation E u .
We say a distinguisher is (q, σ)-CPA if it asks at most q encryption queries such that total number of blocks in all queries is at most σ. Similarly we can define (q, σ)-CCA distinguisher where it can ask both encryption and decryption queries. 
where maximum is taken over all (q, σ)-CPA distinguishers. CCA advantage of A and sprp-insecurity of a blockcipher can be defined similarly. Let A (q, σ) where F is an online cipher. It is the maximum CPA or CCA advantage for (q, σ) distinguishers distinguishing F from the ideal online cipher Π u .
Initially P = ∅ and a function Γ : The longest common prefix of M, M ∈ G * (or LCP(M, M )) is the block-sequence N ∈ G such that N is a longest common prefix of M and M . One can check that LCP(M, M ) always exists and it is unique. The length of the longest common prefix is denoted by M,M . Any element of the form τ =
+ is known as qr-tuple or query-response tuple 1 where M i 's and
2 . Now we provide bounds of interpolation probability of UROP Π u .
Lemma 2.3 (Interpolation probability of UROP)
Proof. The first part of the lemma is clearly true since for any online permutation f , ((
Now we prove the for online-compatible tuple. Let p ∈ P :
where
This completes the proof. Now we define an important object called view or transcript 3 of a distinguisher which actually contains all query-responses in the form of tuple. 
( We say that a tuple τ :
are given as 1 Later we see that the pair (M i , C i ) corresponds to a query-response pair where M i is encryption query and C i is response or C i is decryption query and M i is response.
2 Clearly, j = ||p|| but there can be more than one choices of i. So we need to check well defined-ness of q p . Suppose
3 the term "transcript" has been used in many literatures, but in this paper we mainly use the word view as it really signifies the view of the oracle which is obtained by the distinguisher after having query-responses. 4 in both cases we have g(M i ) = C i .
query-responses for the first (i − 1) queries. Clearly, a view view(
is always A-compatible. A-compatibility of a tuple is completely independent with oracles. Let τ be a A-compatible tuple. Then,
Then for an oracle g we have,
Now we define some views, subsets of T oc , called bad views and bound the probability that a bad view occurs when a distinguisher is interacting with uniform random online permutation Π u . These bad views will be considered as bad views for the online ciphers HCBC1, HCBC2, MHCBC and MCBC. Define x p = last(p) and y p = last(q p ) where .
Proposition 2.5 For any (q, σ) CPA-distinguisher A interacting with a uniform random online permutation
Π u , Pr[view(A Π ) ∈ V bad,1 ] ≤ σ(σ−1)
2N . For any (q, σ) CCA-distinguisher A interacting with a uniform random online permutation Π u and its inverse (Π
u ) −1 , Pr[view(A Π u ,(Π u ) −1 ) ∈ V bad,i ] ≤ (σ+2)(σ+3) N , i = 2, 3, 4.
Proof. Let us consider dictionary order ≺ on the set of pairs (i, j). Thus, (i , j ) ≺ (i, j) if either i < i or i = i and j < j.
If view(A Π ) ∈ V bad,1 then there must exist smallest
) the above event holds with probability at most 2N . Note that if τ ∈ V bad,4 then trivially τ ∈ V bad,j for j = 2, 3. Thus we need to prove only for τ ∈ V bad,4 . A similar approach as described for V bad,1 can be applied.
If
th query is decryption query) is uniformly distributed over a set of size at least N −k +1, the above event holds with probability at most (
Then we have Adv
Proof. Here we denote τ = ((
Now we state an important result which is corollary from strong interpolation theorem (see theorem 2.6), interpolation probability for UROP (see lemma 2.3) and the above proposition 2.5. This result is going to be used for obtaining bound for advantages of online ciphers considered in this paper.
Proposition 2.7 (main tool of the paper) Let F be an online cipher. Suppose for some 1 ≤ k ≤ 4 and for all τ ∈ T oc \ V bad,i , the interpolation probability of F satisfies the following equation
3 Two known online ciphers : HCBC1 and HCBC2
HCBC1 [1]
Given a permutation π ∈ Perm(G) and a hash function h :
Note that HCBC1[π, h] is an online permutation. The online property can be proved by induction as the i th output block only depends on (i − 1) th output block and i th input block. It is also a permutation and its inverse is defined as From the definition of HCBC1 one can verify the following equivalences.
Thus while computing the interpolation we have (h(last(q chop(p) )) + last(p)) p∈P M corresponding to the all inputs of E u and (last(q p )) p∈P M corresponding to the all outputs of E u . Since τ ∈ V good,1 , last(q p )'s are distinct for all p ∈ P M . Thus, all outputs of E u are distinct. Now we prove that for all
Thus, all inputs of E u are distinct with probability at least 1−ε σ 2 . Moreover, the inputs and outputs are independent with E u since h is independent with
.j]. P M is the set of non-empty prefixes of
where H1 is based on ε-∆universal hash function. If we consider the finite field multiplication based universal hash function then Adv
HCBC2 [1]
Now we make similar study for HCBC2. We follow same notations as given in HCBC1 except that h :
where 
Interpolation probability of H2
We compute q-interpolation probability of H2 for any given type-2 qr-tuple τ :
From the definition of HCBC2 we have the following equivalences. 
Thus, all inputs and outputs of E u are distinct with probability at least 1 − 2ε σ 2 and the inputs and outputs are independent with E u (since h is independent with E u ). So by applying the proposition 2.2,
Theorem 3.3 (interpolation probability of HCBC2)
Corollary 3.4 Let A be a (q, σ)-CCA distinguisher then we have
where H2 is based on ε-∆universal hash function. If we consider the finite field multiplication based universal hash function then Adv
Thus, all inputs and outputs of E u are distinct with probability at least 1 − 2ε σ 2 and these are independent with E u (since h is independent with E u ). So by applying the proposition 2.2, A be a (q, σ) -CCA distinguisher then we have
Corollary 4.2 Let
where H3 is based on ε-∆universal hash function. If we consider the finite field multiplication based universal hash function then Adv
MCBC or modified-CBC
A simple replacement of H of MHCBC by v (note that, from example 2.2 we know that v is universal hash function) would not make CCA-secure. So define H 3(
is also known to us and call it v 1 . Now, H'3(v 0 , v 1 ) = (0, v 1 ⊕ v 0 ) always true where this is true with probability close to 1/N for the ideal online cipher. Thus we can have CCA-attack by making only three queries with four blocks.
Let π ∈ Perm(G) then we define MCBC or modified CBC online permutation as follows : MCBC does not use any universal hash function since the underlying block cipher is used in the place of the universal of hash function. Thus we are able to remove extra key storage as well as an extra design of universal hash function. The proof idea for MCBC is similar to MHCBC except the fact that we have to consider all inputs and outputs of the underlying block ciphers. We have to be little bit careful while computing interpolation probability. We first see all inputs and outputs of the uniform random permutation E u during the computations of interpolation probability of MC( (N, σ) .
Thus we have the following main theorem for MCBC. 
Theorem 4.3 (interpolation probability of MCBC)
Pr[MC(M 1 ) = C 1 , · · · , MC(M q ) = C q ] ≥ 1 − 5σ 2 /N P(N, σ) ∀((M 1 , C 1 ), · · · , (M q , C q )) ∈ V good,4(9)
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze known online ciphers namely HCBC1 and HCBC2 and propose two new online ciphers MHCBC and MCBC which have several advantages over the previous ones. In particular, MHCBC is more efficient than HCBC2 and still has CCA-security. MCBC online cipher does not need any universal hash function and hence it has better performance as well as smaller key size. Our security analysis is somewhat different from the usual game based security analysis. We believe that our proof technique would be useful in many areas where indistinguishability is concerned. One of the research goal we can think is to provide online ciphers for incomplete plaintext blocks. One can analyze the hardware performance of all these online ciphers.
